Report: The Looming Taiwan Fighter Gap

October 1, 2012

The Looming Taiwan Fighter Gap

(Hershey, Pennsylvania, October 1, 2012)

Edited by Lotta Danielsson
Released at the 2012 US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference
Published by the US-Taiwan Business Council

The US-Taiwan Business Council is committed to providing our members and the broader policy-making community with political, economic, and strategic insight into American interests in our relationship with Taiwan. It is part of our continuing efforts to offer value-added benefits to all our member companies, as well as to all those who are active in the bilateral relationship.

In the period after the September 2011 notification to Congress of an upgrade program for Taiwan’s existing fleet of 145 F-16A/B fighters, the messaging from both Washington and Taipei would have us believe that this had been the intent for Taiwan’s air force modernization all along – for Taiwan to choose between upgrading its F-16A/Bs or to purchase new F-16C/Ds. Following this line of thinking, the upgrade program announcement in 2011 addressed all of Taiwan’s air power needs for the foreseeable future. This is simply not the case.

Over the past decade and more, China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Air Force has made significant qualitative and quantitative improvements to its fighter fleet, a challenge that is driving Taiwan’s requirement for a robust and modern fighter force. Despite the clear need for more and modern aircraft, that Taiwan requirement was immediately plunged into the political realm in 2006 when the administration of former President George W. Bush refused to accept Taiwan’s Letter of Request (LOR) for 66 new F-16 C/Ds. Since 2006, Taiwan’s air defense requirement has served as a political football for the Bush, Hu Jintao, Barack Obama, and Ma Ying-jeou governments – with all four jockeying in an attempt to come out on top. As it stands right now, it is clear that the Chinese position has prevailed. Using its political and economic clout, China seems to have been able to persuade policy-makers in Washington that they have already done enough, and that no further action on the Taiwan fighter requirement is needed.

Taiwan approaches the retirement of its F-5 fleet, and is facing declining availability for its Mirage 2000s and F-CK-1A/B Indigenous Defense Fighters (IDFs). By 2016, as Taiwan begins to withdraw portions of its existing F-16A/B fighter fleet for modernization under the upgrade program, Taiwan faces a precipitous fighter gap. With up to a squadron of F-16A/B fighters unavailable for each year of the upgrade, and at an estimated 70% availability, Taiwan may be left with as few as 73 operational F-16A/B fighters to handle its peace time and war time contingencies. This number is so low as to create a destabilizing force in the Taiwan Strait, and could encourage the PLA to undertake a military solution.

This US-Taiwan Business Council report examines the threat from China and the extent to which Taiwan faces a looming fighter gap. We then make some recommendations on how the United States and Taiwan should proceed.

This report was produced by the Council’s membership, as well as with the help of several outside experts who spent their valuable time reviewing, fact-checking, and otherwise contributing to this report. Their perspectives and sage advice throughout the process proved invaluable. I wish to express my sincere gratitude to my colleague Lotta Danielsson whose dedication to the production of this report made the final product possible.

The Council believes we can continue to contribute in a meaningful way to the health of America’s relationship with Taiwan. However, we can only continue that work with the tremendous support of our member companies, for which we are deeply grateful.

Council President, Rupert Hammond-Chambers

Lessons and experiences from previous Taiwan Strait crises have shown that it is imperative for Taiwan to maintain a measure of qualitative superiority over China – not only to attempt to prevail in conflict, but also to reinforce deterrence, to allow Taiwan to negotiate from a position of strength, and to prevent war. However, a careful and objective analysis of the current balance of air power in the Taiwan Strait reveals that Taiwan’s current air defense forces are only marginally capable of meeting the island’s air defense needs, and that it faces real and significant future challenges in maintaining its current capabilities.

The U.S. decision in 2011 to assist Taiwan with the mid-life upgrade (MLU) of its existing fleet of F-16A/B fighters will significantly improve Taiwan’s air defense capabilities. Nevertheless, the upgrade program still does not adequately address all of Taiwan’s legitimate air defense requirements. Without additional procurement programs, a tangible and substantial front-line fighter gap will develop in Taiwan within the next five to ten years, as a significant portion of the Taiwan Air Force (TAF) aircraft inventory reaches the end of its useful service life.

Taiwan’s fleet of Mirage 2000s and the F-CK-1A/B Indigenous Defense Fighter (IDF) both contend with serious availability issues, and may be facing retirement after 2018. The shortfall in front-line fighters will be further exacerbated by the rapidly approaching obsolescence of Taiwan’s fleet of F-5 Lead-In Fighter Training (LIFT) aircraft. Together, this will reduce the Taiwan air defense force structure to rely primarily on a small fleet of 145 F-16A/Bs whose operational rate takes the number of available planes to approximately 107.

During the scheduled upgrade program for these fighters, however, as many as a squadron (24) at a time of F16A/Bs will be unavailable for service, further reducing Taiwan’s air defense forces. By 2023, at the expected end of the upgrade program, Taiwan’s operationally-available fighter strength will have declined to a point where the TAF will no longer possess the minimum requisite number of combat aircraft necessary to defend its air space from Chinese aggression or military coercion. Moreover, the quantitative shortfall is certain to also erode the quality of Taiwan’s air force, manifesting in decreased aircraft performance, reduced pilot training opportunities, and lack of pilot experience.

This significant air power shortfall will emerge in Taiwan while China continues to aggressively modernize and expand its missile strike capabilities, and while the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is simultaneously and rapidly introducing modern combat aircraft into service in large numbers.

The United States has both a clear legal and moral obligation to respond to the ongoing Chinese intimidation tactics and attempts at coercion of Taiwan. Under the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), Washington must ready itself and Taiwan to resist that coercion. The germane parts of the TRA make it the policy of the United States:
– to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States;
– to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character; and
– to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.

Arguably the mere existence of China’s current large arsenal of ballistic missiles, land attack cruise missiles (LACMs), and fighter aircraft opposite Taiwan is “a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific,” as it is undermining the long-standing, stability-enhancing military balance in the region. Clearly targeted at Taiwan, China’s standing arsenal is certainly a means of coercion even if the missiles and aircraft are never used.

The United States and Taiwan need to craft and implement counter-coercive strategies that undercut the utility of Chinese aerospace power, while demonstrating Taiwan’s ability to defend its airspace in peacetime and wartime.

(See attachment for full text)

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