The Ongoing Taiwan Arms Sales Freeze

By President Rupert Hammond-Chambers
September 22, 2026

See also: Rupert Hammond-Chambers On Taiwan: The Fourth Taiwan Arms-Sale Freeze

To USTBC Members & Colleagues,

Taiwan’s democracy and high-tech economy play a crucial role in global affairs. Taiwan is central to the global embrace of a raft of next-generation technologies, including Artificial Intelligence (AI). It is underpinned by a security relationship with the United States that’s existed in several iterations since 1949 and the Chinese Nationalist Party’s (KMT) retreat from China.

A central pillar of that security relationship is the American willingness to sell arms to Taiwan. Indeed, since 1979 it has been embedded in U.S. law, with the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) charging the United States with helping to improve the island’s ability to deter an attack from the hegemonic Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Given these circumstances, we must ask why U.S. President Donald Trump’s second-term administration has now initiated the fourth Taiwan arms-sale freeze since 2005.

• President Trump will meet with Xi this week, at APEC in November, and at the G-20 meeting in December. This makes for a calendar packed with reasons not to move forward with arms sales to Taiwan: the “tyranny of the calendar.” China’s sense of agency in Trump’s considerations also means that an arms sale could come with some cost to bilateral relations — we can expect a tantrum from Beijing. Trump reopened this door, and China will walk through it seeking to capitalize and spook him into further freezes and delays.

• The Trump Administration has let the fox in the henhouse. Telegraphing sensitivity to the Chinese position on Taiwan this past spring, Trump has empowered China to affect his decisions. This rather than considering American national interest and his responsibility, embedded in law, to assist Taiwan in maintaining peace and security in the Taiwan Strait.

• Including the current freeze, we have seen four major arms-sales freezes in the past 21 years, two under former President George W. Bush from 2005-2007 and 2007-2008, and one under former President Barack Obama from 2011-2015. These freezes retarded Taiwan’s force modernization, weakened deterrence across the Taiwan Strait, played havoc with Taiwan government budgeting processes, emboldened the CCP, and violated the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA).

• The 1982 Communique between the U.S. and China sought to bound American arms sales to Taiwan while providing a pathway towards ending support. That commitment was conditional on the threat to Taiwan from the CCP being reduced and then halted. In essence, America agreed to stop selling weapons to Taiwan when China posed no military threat to the island and its people.

• China sees only the American obligation in the 1982 communique while ignoring its own responsibility to cease threatening Taiwan. The two are inexorably intertwined, and the failure by China to follow through on its commitment to a peaceful resolution of cross-Strait differences also negates the U.S. commitment to stop selling weapons to Taiwan.

• It is essential to understand that China’s central issue with arms sales isn’t necessarily the platform or system being sold, or even the dollar value of the program(s). Rather, it’s the sovereignty conferred in the government-to-government sales process that underpins America’s security relationship with Taiwan. The sale could be a 7.62mm bullet or a fully loaded F-16 Block 70 Viper; the CCP objects equally. The notion that appeasing China will result in a quid pro quo concession is false, as the CCP rejects outright any responsibility to change its behavior. It sees the obligation as America’s alone, and therefore devoid of any Chinese deliverables in exchange — whether to reduce the cross-Strait threat or to make a concession in another area.

• The first Trump administration demonstrated that the best course of action is to regularize arms sales, and U.S. President Joe Biden continued to do so through his term. Given the expanding demands of Taiwan force modernization, keeping up a steady cadence of arms sales ensures no disruption to the process of enhancing deterrence. It supports Taiwan while also strengthening America’s own Indo-Pacific Command. China continued to object, but the objections became increasingly rote and had little material impact on bilateral relations. Indeed, note that Chinese announcements of associated “sanctions” do not disrupt core Chinese interests; they’re designed primarily for domestic optics.

• Mr. Trump’s belief that he cannot maintain America’s commitment to Taiwan while managing U.S.-China relations is not born out by history – indeed, even his first term’s history. He is being persuaded that he must shut down all Taiwan engagement for fear that China will disrupt the flow of rare earths. Yet he has agency in this too. History does not support the view that the Chinese will reciprocate. Instead, they will pocket the concession and attempt to redefine America’s commitment to the island.

You can find the full essay I wrote on the fourth Taiwan arms freeze since 2005 here:
https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2026/09/21/2003864603

Sincerely yours,

Rupert J. Hammond-Chambers
President
US-Taiwan Business Council

See also: Taiwan Arms Sales Notified to Congress 1990-2025, which provides the data for arms sales freezes.